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Using a gendered analysis, this article examines the post election violence (PEV) in Kibera, Kenya, between December 2007 and February 2008. Through in-
depth interviews with Kibera residents, the article interrogates how gender influenced violent mobilizations in Kenya’s most notorious slum. Most scholarly 
analyses have tended to understand the post-election violence as a result of politicized ethnic identities, class, and local socio-economic dynamics. Implicitly 
or explicitly, these frameworks assume that women are victims of violence while men are its perpetrators, and ignore the ways in which gender, which cuts 
across these categories, produces and shapes conflict. Kibera’s conflict is often ascribed to the mobilization of disaffected male youths by political “Big Men.” 
But the research findings show how men, who would ordinarily not go to war, are obliged to fight to “save face” in their communities and how women become 
integral to the production of violent exclusionary mobilizations. Significantly, notions of masculinity and femininity modified the character of Kibera’s conflict. 
Acts of gender-based violence, gang rapes, and forced circumcisions became intensely entwined with ethno-political performances to annihilate opposing 
groups. The battle for political power was also a battle of masculinities.
Broaching the subject of the 2007/8 post election violence 
(PEV) in Kibera with residents who lived through it ines-
capably changes the mood of the conversation. Heads 
shake, eyes drop, and a silence engulfs what might have 
been a lively and vigorous discussion. When people begin 
to talk again, it is in halting whispers. “Mimi siwezi tamani 
kua hivyo tena”: I would not wish to go back to that again, 
a businesswoman in Laini Saba, one of Kibera’s thirteen 
villages said to me.1 I heard this refrain again and again.
According to the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, about 1,200 Kenyans were killed, 300,000 
displaced, and millions of Kenyan shillings worth of prop-
erty and goods destroyed during the 2007/8 PEV. Kibera, 
which lies five kilometers from Nairobi’s city centre, was 
one of the worst-affected areas. A survey undertaken in the 
slum showed that as many as sixty people lost their lives in 
the violence – almost half the total for the whole of Nairobi 
(de Smedt 2009).2 Even more live with scars of rape and 
forced circumcision (Musau 2011). Millions of shillings 
worth of property was looted and burned as ethnic militias 
rallied behind their leaders: Raila Odinga, the Luo leader of 
the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), and Mwai 
Kibaki, the Kikuyu founder of the rival Party of National 
Unity (PNU). The violence only ended after a peace agree-
ment between the two leaders in February 2008.
After February 2008 Kibera’s households organized them-
selves into ethnic enclaves, with each of the slum’s villages 
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1 Kibera’s villages include Kianda, Soweto West, 
Raila, Gatwekera, Makina, Kisumu Ndogo, Kambi 
Muru, Kichinjio, Mashimoni, Laini Saba, Lindi, 
Soweto East and Silanga
If there are no elections we are friends, kama ndugu na dada, like 
brothers and sisters.
With elections we are enemies.
Stall owner in Laini Saba, Kibera
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becoming even more ethnically homogenized (Waki et al. 
2008). One interviewee explained it as follows:
Mashimoni is considered a Luo place, Kisumu Ndogo is Luo-
dominated but also has other tribes like Luhyias. Makina is 
where you find a majority of Nubians, and Laini Saba has 
Kikuyus and Kambas. Luos live in Gatwekera and Olympic. It 
didn’t used to be like this, we were all mixed. But since the elec-
tions, we have developed ethnic strongholds in the slum.
The ethnic enclaves were practical for those who lived in 
Kibera, and made business and safety sense. If a Luo land-
lord had rental housing in Kikuyu-dominated Laini Saba, 
they sought Kikuyu tenants to safeguard their investments 
in the event of political violence. Across the settlement, 
landlords and tenants negotiated swaps to move people to 
areas where their ethnic group was the majority. This for-
mula worked for everyone: landlords protected their 
investment and tenants and their neighbors were safer. As 
one Luo, a single mother who rents out eight rooms in 
Kikuyu-dominated Laini Saba, put it:
I rent my rooms out to Kikuyus, that way I know my business is 
safe. No-one pushed me to go and live in Mashimoni and pay 
rent there even when I own houses in Laini Saba. But I did it 
because I knew I would be safer and my property would be 
safer in case violence broke out again. It was our only guarantee, 
to be in a place where the majority are your tribe.
This article uses a gendered lens to understand the conflict 
that led to the ethnic enclaving of Kibera after the PEV. It 
explores the ways the social construction of masculinities 
and femininities shaped the production of the violence. It 
describes how gender necessarily intersects with ethnic, 
political, and class identities during times of conflict. The 
modes of violence manifested in Kibera after the elections 
cannot be explained by ethnic/political identities alone. By 
looking at gender, we can understand why men, who would 
not ordinarily go to war, are obliged to fight to “save face” 
in their communities. Similarly, the narratives of Kibera 
residents illustrate how integral women are to the produc-
tion of violent exclusionary mobilizations. I argue that if 
we ignore gender, we cannot fully understand why forced 
circumcisions and rapes became part of the machinery of 
violence. Indeed, we cannot disentangle gender norms 
from ethnic and political identities in Kibera’s 2007/8 PEV. 
The ways in which gender-based violence occurred illus-
trates the desire to annihilate the ethnic and political integ-
rity of opposing groups.
The research is based on in-depth interviews with Kibera 
residents conducted between February 2012 and April 
2013. The interviews were held with men and women from 
different ethnic, class, and educational backgrounds. The 
author also sat in meetings of organizations that were 
active in preventing a repeat of the PEV in the 2013 presi-
dential race: Peacenet, Community Housing Finance, and 
Kenya Tunauwezo.
1. Kibera – the Background
Established around one hundred years ago, Kibera began as 
a settlement for aging Sudanese Nubian askaris, members 
of the British army’s King’s African Rifles.3 The Nubians 
were settled on land that was then a military training 
ground, as a reward from the British government for their 
loyalty and service protecting the railway line that linked 
Uganda to the Kenyan coast (Parsons 1997; de Smedt 
2011). What started out as a settlement for aging Sudanese 
veterans and widows soon expanded with the migration 
and integration of local populations. Although the Nubians 
were the original settlers of Kibera they never acquired 
legal title to the land. The British were reluctant to grant 
them legal ownership because of the value of the land, and 
racial tensions with neighboring Europeans.
As Nairobi city grew, so too did Kibera. As one of the few 
places where Africans could live close to the city, it 
attracted ethnic groups from all over the country because 
of its proximity to the industrial area, city center and 
neighboring middle-class housing estates. Kibera’s popu-
lation figures are highly contested. Kenya’s 2009 census 
counted 170,070 inhabitants, significantly lower than ear-
2 Athough the word “slum” is sometimes considered 
derogatory and inappropriate amongst development 
practitioners and academics, I use the term in this 
article because it is how Kibera residents refer to 
their settlement.
3 For a comprehensive historical analysis, see (Par-
sons 1997; Williams 2011; de Smedt 2011)
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lier estimates of 700,000 to 1,000,000 (Research Inter-
national 2005; Desgroppes and Taupin 2011). Although 
Kibera’s population is ethnically mixed, it is easy to see how 
group imbalances fuel ethnic and class tensions within the 
settlement (De Smedt 2009). Recent statistics show that 
Luos comprise 36 percent, Luhya 27 percent, Kamba 15 per-
cent, and Nubians only a small fraction (Marx, Stoker, and 
Suri 2015). Although Kikuyus are the majority ethnic group 
in the country, they form only 6 percent of the population of 
Kibera. Nevertheless, they wield enormous economic power 
as one of the main structure-owning groups (together with 
Nubians they represent 55 percent of landlords) (Marx, 
Stoker, and Suri 2015; Joireman and Vanderpoel 2010).
To add to the precariousness generated by ethnic and class 
inequalities, neither tenants nor landlords possess legal title 
to land. Although there is a robust land and property mar-
ket (Syagga, Mitullah, and Karirah-Gitau 2002), Kibera’s 
land is legally owned by various Kenya government depart-
ments and parastatals (Williams 2011). Any land trans-
actions and ownership claims in the settlement are 
therefore outside of state laws and regulations. This uncer-
tainty only exacerbates ethnic tensions. When questions of 
indigeneity arise, the fissures between groups intensify: 
Nubians as the “original” settlers versus all “other groups”; 
long-standing communities like the Luo and Luhya versus 
“recent” migrants; landowners versus tenants, and so on. 
These structural insecurities only worsen what is already a 
fragile social, political, and economic situation.
1.1. The “Stolen” 2007 Elections
Witness accounts of the PEV violence across Kenya 
describe a series of phases (Waki et al. 2008). Interviewees 
in Kibera distinguish two. Violence first broke out after the 
electoral commission announced the victory of Mwai 
Kibaki on 30 December 2007. “People didn’t believe it”, a 
woman in Mashimoni village told me.
Kenya’s 2007 elections were indeed different from previous 
ones. In an effort to promote transparency, the electoral com-
mission broadcast the results live on television as they came 
in from constituencies across the country. The televised 
counting showed Kibaki’s rival Raila Odinga in the lead in 
many constituencies. “Something didn’t add up” said another 
respondent, “the elections showed Raila winning, and [this] 
we could see live on the television. So when Kibaki was 
sworn in, people got angry, that is when the violence started.”
Kibera is a Raila stronghold, and the initial unrest was 
related to the frustration of Raila supporters who believed 
the election had been stolen. The violence began in Toi mar-
ket at the northern end of Kibera, where discontented Raila 
supporters destroyed three thousand stalls belonging to 
traders from different ethnic backgrounds (Waki et al. 
2008). Although accounts differ slightly between different 
parts of Kibera, the majority of those I spoke to said that the 
early unrest seemed “random”. In other words, business-
people of all ethnic backgrounds suffered losses and damage 
to property when what people saw as a legitimate protest 
against election rigging turned into vandalism and theft.
1.2. The Ethnic Turn
It was what respondents called the second phase that intro-
duced a violent ethnic aspect into the conflict and resulted in 
the systematic carving out of ethnic enclaves. Although the 
ethnic partitioning of Kibera does not easily fit the xeno-
phobic framework of discrimination against foreign 
nationals, it points to the multiple repertoires of violent 
mobilization against “the other” in contemporary African 
cities. After a week of violence triggered by the announce-
ment of the election results, people began to rebuild their 
businesses and prepare for the beginning of the school year 
believing that the unrest was over (Kihato 2013). Then, in 
mid-January, what respondents describe as ethnically-driven 
revenge attacks began. According to interviews, this round of 
violence was triggered by the killing of Kikuyus in a church 
in the Rift Valley a few hundred miles away. “That is when 
Luos and Luhyias in Laini Saba [a Kikuyu stronghold] were 
targeted by Kikuyu militia, the Mūngiki and flushed out”, 
said one Luo respondent who owns rooms for rent in Laini 
Saba and was herself “flushed out”.4 Barely a kilometer south 
of Laini Saba, in the Luo strongholds of Gatwekera and 
4 For more on the Mungiki and its formation see 
Anderson (2002) and Wamue (2001).
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Kisumu Ndogo, Kikuyus were flushed out of their homes in 
apparent revenge for the evictions in Laini Saba. The murder 
of a prominent member of Raila Odinga’s Orange Demo-
cratic Movement later in the month only escalated the eth-
nic character of the violence (de Smedt 2009; Waki et al. 
2008). So a process triggered by a national political event 
took on a causality of its own, producing multiple forms of 
violence that became deeply contextualized to Kibera’s local 
socio-economic and political dynamics.
1.3. Kibera: A Microcosm of Kenya’s Gendered Ethno-politics
Kenya’s history of politicized tribalism and patrimonial 
politics dates back to colonial rule (Lonsdale 1992). Decades 
of colonial and post-colonial rule have encouraged a system 
which links the distribution of national resources to eth-
nicity. During elections, as the quote introducing this article 
indicates, ethno-political identity is heightened as national 
politicians exploit ethnic differences. In the PEV there is 
both firm and anecdotal evidence that “Big Men” paid youth 
groups and gangs in Kibera to fight opposition groups there 
(Waki et al. 2008; Kenya National Commission on Human 
Rights 2008; Odallo 2010). One interviewee stated: “I know 
some guys who were getting paid one hundred shillings to 
kill people. Can you imagine what can you do with one 
hundred shillings? Yet these guys would take people’s lives”.
Nestled tightly between middle-class estates, Kibera has 
attracted significant scholarly attention because of its posi-
tion as an opposition stronghold and its patron, the promi-
nent political leader Raila Odinga. To explain Kibera’s PEV 
and ethnic “flushing”, some scholars point to the failure of 
the Kenyan state and the patrimonial nature of its politics 
(Branch 2008; Klopp and Kamungi 2008). These state-
centered analyses show how the state’s long history of 
oppression, its inability to address regional (ethnic) 
inequalities, its links to gangs, and its failing countervailing 
institutions foment violence and exclusionary politics at a 
local level (Klopp and Kamungi 2008; Cussac 2008; Mau-
peu 2008; Lafargue and Katumanga 2008). Yet while the 
Kenyan state is complicit in the production of an exclu-
sionary and often violent politics, state-centered analyses 
fail to take into consideration the emergence of insurgent 
local political groups that seek to command and control 
local resources through networks of patronage and viol-
ence (Médard 2008). Although these groups may have links 
to leaders at the national level for example Mungiki to 
Kikuyu leaders, Taliban to Luo leaders (Anderson 2002), 
their goals are rarely to take over the state, but rather to 
control local resource allocations. Other scholars point to 
the unequal impact of global economic and development 
processes. Tutzer (2010) argues that while a weak state and 
patrimonial politics may have kindled ethnic conflict, the 
negative economic effects of structural adjustment pro-
grams resulting in income inequalities have left national 
leaders little choice but to compete for ever-dwindling 
resources along ethnic lines.
1.4. Intersecting National and Local Political Agendas
While broad structural processes can provide an under-
standing of the context within which violence can occur, it 
is the ways in which these intersect with local dynamics 
that explains why a place like Kibera might be particularly 
susceptible to violence. One group of authors looks at how 
class, historical processes of exclusion, the mobilization of 
gangs, and local governance structures provide a context 
for violence in Kibera (Shilaho 2006; Dimova 2010; Dercon 
and Gutiérrez-Romero 2012). Shilaho argues that the 
unequal nature of land allocations in Kibera fed into the 
violent conflict (2006) while Médard points to the emerg-
ence of local militias (2008). De Smedt highlights the limits 
of national patronage systems and the importance of local 
class dynamics in fuelling the violence in Kibera (2009).
Perhaps one of the clearest examples of the way local and 
national struggles intersect is the landlord/tenant relation-
ship. Kibera is a political stronghold for Raila Odinga, and 
his Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) has a significant 
following there. Kikuyus in Kibera are in the minority, yet are 
seen as a wealthier business community. These class dif-
ferences increase local ethnic and political tensions. When, in 
a bid to gain votes for the 1992 presidential election, Raila 
Odinga supported a Luo rental boycott, Kikuyu structure 
owners and Nubian landlords were hard-hit (de Smedt 
2011). With the “Big Man’s” protection, Luo tenants felt 
emboldened to stop paying rents to their largely Kikuyu 
landlords. While this helped Raila garner votes in Kibera, it 
also suited local actors who felt exploited by the high rentals 
of poor-quality housing – providing an outlet for class ani-
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mosity. The tension between tenants and landlords continues 
to play a part in the local struggle for power and resources, 
and a race for national political office often exacerbates it.
Whatever their merits, the analyses of PEV in Kibera 
remain gender-blind. They ignore the ways gender roles 
shape the nature of conflict and conversely, how gendering 
conflict shifts the assumptions we make about gender roles 
in society. Most analyses fail to tell us how the distribution 
of power, resources, and access to governance structures at 
global, national, and local levels differentially affects men 
and women. So while we have knowledge of how inequal-
ities between ethnic, class, and political groups influence the 
nature of conflicts, we have far less insight into how gender, 
which crosscuts all these groups, produces and shapes con-
flict (Byrne 1996). The following sections explore this 
dimension in the context of Kibera and seek answers to the 
following questions: How did being a man or woman in 
Kibera during the PEV impact upon ethnic and political 
identities? How did discourses of masculinity and feminin-
ity as understood in Kibera’s context influence the way 
women and men participated in (or abstained from) the 
conflict? How did gender modify the nature of the violence?
2. The Art of War and the Politics of the Mundane
Kibera’s violence illustrates how decisions that are often 
considered personal and apolitical become highly sig-
nificant in the context of unrest. Aside from the fear and 
the brutal nature of the violence, what people remember 
most is the hunger they experienced. At the time, walking 
through Kibera – whether by day or night – was almost lit-
erally a matter of life and death. Militias from different 
groups guarded the entrances to the slum and cordoned off 
the settlement. A man in Gatwekera said:
You walked through Kibera holding your ID high in your hand. 
If you were in dangerous territory you would be pleading for 
your life. If you were in a place with your own tribe, you spoke 
the language loudly so that the gangs would know who you were.
In Laini Saba, Kikuyu militias set up roadblocks to vet who 
came in and out. Luo or Luhyia were likely to be assaulted 
or murdered. The Luo Taliban militia manned entrances 
into Mashimoni, and Kikuyus passing through would be 
assaulted or murdered. These roadblocks meant that few 
people could leave the slum to buy food and no supplies 
could come in. Those who had food supplies in their shops 
were too frightened to open them for fear of their lives and 
property. When they did open, they sold their produce 
through a small window for no more than ten or twenty 
minutes at a time. “We had money but it was useless 
because we could not buy food”, said one woman in Olym-
pic neighborhood. “Cabbage was ten shillings [approxi-
mately 14 US cents] before the violence” a second-hand 
clothes seller in Laini Saba related, “but during the violence 
it went up to seventy bob [seventy Kenya shillings, approxi-
mately one US dollar at the time). Cooking oil was too 
expensive for me to afford at that time.”
With growing hunger, decisions about food – finding it, 
cooking it, and who would eat it – became the main pre-
occupation of Kibera’s residents. The fixation on food was 
important not only for physical survival, but also for the 
survival of the factions fighting in the unrest. We know 
from contexts of war in Africa, South-East Asia, and Latin 
America that women play an indispensable part in its pro-
duction (Cock 1991; Enloe 2004; Afshar 2004; Thompson 
2006; El-Bushra 2004). In Kibera food, and with it women, 
became an integral part of the violence because the militias 
needed to eat in order to the secure their territories. 
Women in Kibera were expected to cook for the gangs who 
secured the perimeters of their enclaves. Some of the 
women I interviewed said that they were forced into this 
role and had no choice. Others understood it as a kind of 
barter: “Our men were out there fighting for us, we needed 
to feed them and make them strong so that they could pro-
tect us and our property,” said a businesswomen in Laini 
Saba. In one section of Laini Saba, where business owners 
had millions of shillings worth of goods to lose in the viol-
ence, neighbors organized around tasks like cooking:
One person would volunteer their house to cook and we would 
contribute what we had to cook for the neighbors and the men. 
Let me make it clear, there was no planning that we are going to 
fight. It just happened randomly after the announcement of the 
results from the media.
There were areas in Kibera that were not as organized, 
where cooking was less communal. Nevertheless, militia 
youth in these areas would demand food from houses 
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where women were cooking. “You understand that you 
cannot cook in Kibera without your neighbor knowing?” 
said a woman living with her three children in her one-
hundred-square-foot room in Gatwekera:
Even though we have our own homes, we live on top of each 
other. If I had little food to cook for my children, I could not 
hide it from others, and the gangs would always know where the 
food was. We were forced to feed them. What could I do? They 
were keeping us safe.
“Sometimes it was a matter of choosing whether you would 
go hungry or you would feed the men,” said another 
woman who lives in Kibera’s Soweto section. “I remember 
many nights when I had to decide who to feed – my hun-
gry and crying child, or my husband who was out all night 
fighting? Can you make that choice?” The presence of the 
militia was also important for those with business and 
property in Kibera who had managed to leave after the 
violence broke out. “The business people paid youth to pro-
tect their property. You have to be preparing food for these 
people to make sure they were able to protect.” Kibera’s 
women are not alone: women’s roles in war are far-ranging, 
from supportive roles as care-givers, nurses, cooks (that 
reinforce their gendered roles) to combat fighting along-
side men. In Thompson’s words, “[women] are an integral 
part of the political economy of war and the financing of 
war” (2006, 348).
Once food supplies ran out in a household, someone had to 
try to find sustenance. That task sometimes fell on women 
because they seemed more likely to be able to plead for 
sympathy if they encountered opposing gangs. One Luhyia 
woman described her fearful encounter with Mungiki in 
Laini Saba while carrying vegetable oil.
I had to cross Laini Saba to go to Mashimoni where, as a Luhyia, 
I was safer … I met a group of Mūngiki. They were a few men, I 
can’t remember how many, but I recognized one of them. He is 
elderly and lives down the road here. I know him and his wife 
well. I was so scared. I had bought cooking oil in town and was 
carrying it in a paper bag. The younger Mūngiki man, the leader, 
took my cooking oil and said to me: “These are the women who 
cook for their men so that they can beat us up. We need to teach 
you people a lesson”. I pleaded with him, crying to let me go. “I 
am a mother”, I said to them, “I have no problems with any-
body.” 
The woman eventually escaped unharmed after her Kikuyu 
neighbor vouched for her, and the gang allowed her to con-
tinue to Mashimoni with her cooking oil.
If women’s decisions around cooking and food provision 
were politicized during the violence, so too was sleep. In 
Laini Saba, groups of neighbors organized to protect their 
lives and property. At night, women and men would form 
security groups on their streets and take turns sleeping. 
“Sleep became a luxury” one Kikuyu businesswoman said to 
me. “First of all you were scared to go into your house to 
sleep in case the Luo gangs came. Second, if you were seen to 
be sleeping too much, your own people would begin to say 
that you were not helping to keep property safe”. Another 
businesswoman in Laini Saba said: “We were not sleeping at 
night, we would huddle together and protect our property.”
Commonplace assumptions tend to make women invisible 
in war times. Even where they are acknowledged as actors 
in a conflict, they are understood as playing “supportive” 
roles to men who fight or design war strategies. This per-
spective not only devalues women and validates certain 
acts of war over others, but is blind to the ways in which 
conflict is produced and reproduced. If we understand 
conflict and its production as broader than the moment of 
violence, as incorporating spaces beyond the battlefield, 
and as integrating a diverse cast beyond soldiers, generals, 
or gangs – we begin to see its long production line and the 
multitude of actors who facilitate its progression (Enloe 
2004).
3. Scrambling Gender Roles in Kibera’s Conflict
If taking a step back from the battlefield allows us to see 
how women play a part in facilitating the manufacture of 
violence, zooming out even further allows us to look at the 
ways male and female socialization shapes conflict. Con-
sciously or unconsciously, society tends to stereotype 
women as violence-loathing – the peace-loving weaker sex 
in need of protection – while men are seen as aggressive 
with an appetite for war and violence (White 2007; Enloe 
2004; Giles and Hyndman 2004; Cock 1991).
Kibera’s conflict both reinforced and disrupted these stereo-
types. Byrne suggests that conflict creates highly volatile and 
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fluid spaces which allow us to problematize the “unques-
tioning and fixed notions of masculinity and femininity at a 
time when gender identities and relations are, as a result of 
conflict, in a considerable state of flux” (Byrne 1996, 31).
When I asked groups of men and women in Kibera what 
social expectations they experienced, they gave standard 
responses: people should be God-fearing and hard-work-
ing. Men are responsible for supporting their families 
financially and women for taking care of the home, prepar-
ing meals, and nurturing children. Yet respondents were 
quick to admit that even in “normal times” these idealized 
notions of masculinity and femininity rarely stood up to 
the realities of everyday life. A casual walk through the 
slum reveals women hard at work in stalls and hair salons 
while young men hang out on street corners. When asked 
about violence, the stock response was that men were 
prone to violence, but not women. “Women are peaceful. 
They don’t like fighting,” was a typical response.
But these commonly held beliefs about male and female 
roles became scrambled during the conflict. In fact, 
contrary to political and scholarly assumptions that women 
are peace-loving and generally absent in war, there is evi-
dence that women actively took part in Kibera’s 2007 post-
election conflict in a variety of ways. Many interviewees 
said that women acted as spies, identifying “enemy homes” 
which would then be looted, burned, or forcefully occu-
pied. One Luhyia woman in Mashimoni said:
Women were generally the ones who pointed out Kikuyu homes 
in this area. It is because as women we are the ones who know 
our neighbors and who lives where in the area. They would 
point to the homes of other tribes.
A Luo woman in Gatwekera related how:
We women would find stones and fill buckets. By this time, we 
had left our children [safe] with relatives outside the slum. 
Women and men – we would all sleep outside. When we heard 
[the call] mawe! stones! we would get the stones from our com-
pound and supply the men who were guarding us.
3.1. “Men Who Behave Like Women”
I was sitting at a makeshift stall along the train tracks in 
Laini Saba talking to a group of women gathered in heated 
conversation. The six women were from diverse ethnic 
groups, and were talking about “men who behave like 
women”, referring to men who stayed at home during the 
unrest. There was laughter as they talked about some men’s 
cowardice, and the way some of them had taunted their 
partners to go out and fight. The conversation continued 
with women making jibes that so-and-so’s husband is not a 
real man because he would not go out to fight.
My neighbor was telling me how she tried to chase her husband 
out of the house. Other men were fighting and hers was just sit-
ting in the house complaining he was hungry.
Another added:
Even me I told mine to stop sitting in the house like a coward, 
“go and fight like a man” I said to him, “stop being a woman!”
A gendered approach allows us to analyze these conver sa -
tions and understand how aggressive militarized masculin-
ities become the ideal in times of violent conflict. The jibes at 
“men who behave like women” are aimed at men con sid er ed 
too weak and cowardly to fight. These “feminizing” insults 
not only draw attention to how women contribute to fuelling 
violence even when they are not actively in volv ed in it them-
selves; they are intended to emasculate these “cowardly” 
men. The slights go right to the heart of understanding how 
gender influences the production and reproduction of viol-
ence. Jacklyn Cock describes how white women in apartheid 
South Africa socialized boys into aggressive masculinities, all 
the while maintaining their gendered roles as peace-loving 
mothers (1991). When we look at gendered relationships in a 
society, and expectations of men and women, we see how 
men, who might ordinarily not go to war, can be pressured 
to do so. Coulter points out how: “Men who refuse to fight 
will often be ridiculed, jailed, or even killed for their coward-
ice, or lack of manliness” (2008, 57).
Masculinist notions also serve as a powerful tools for making 
men into soldiers because military forces encourage aggressive-
ness and competitiveness while censuring emotional 
expressions and denouncing physically weak soldiers as effemi-
nate. (White 2007, 866)
In a militarized context, being a “real man” is associated 
with aggression and a capacity for violence. Yet the meaning 
a “real man” is not static. It shifts during times of conflict 
and in “normal” times. When discussing the 2007/8 viol-
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ence, few interviewees fail to mention the “idlers”, the young 
men with no jobs who spend their days sitting around street 
corners. These idlers, I was told, are violent and dangerous – 
vagrants in the day, muggers and thieves by night. The 
idlers’ aggression is criminalized in normal times, when 
gendered roles in Kibera are normalized, because it is tar-
geted at ordinary citizens trying to make an honest living. 
However, their violence is a celebrated resource during 
times of conflict because it protects families and neigh-
borhoods from opposing ethnic factions. This distinction 
between “good” and “bad violence” seems contradictory. 
Wamucii and Idwasi point to the distinction between legit-
imate security and delinquent violence in Nairobi slums 
(Wamucii and Idwasi 2011). When I posed the question 
why aggression was rejected during times of peace and de -
mand ed, even celebrated, in times of conflict, the responses 
from men and women of all ethnicities and social groups 
were similar: while violence was unwarranted during times 
of war or peace, many argued that wartime aggression was 
socially sanctioned. In the words of a mother whose son 
participated in the violence, “the men were fighting for the 
tribe …to protect the community, they were doing good. If 
they were not there, the Kikuyu gangs would have come 
here.” As Coulter (2008, 55) points out: “War is not a-social, 
but it creates its own social orders …” In a militarized con-
text, new norms and values determine acceptable and unac-
ceptable modes of action and interaction. In times of 
conflict the ideal model of manhood is a militarized one – 
intricately intertwined with violence and obligations to pro-
tect the community and fight the enemy other.
3.2. Masculinized Women
If “feminized” men were ridiculed for being cowardly and 
effeminate, “masculinized” female killers instilled horror. A 
Luhya woman who owns a hair salon in Laini Saba told me 
she witnessed Kikuyu women kill a young man.
It was very difficult for me, very difficult. It is hard to see some-
one, a young boy, being killed. But let me tell you, it is harder 
when it is women who are doing the killing. A woman like me. 
That is not how women are supposed to be.
These destabilizing acts allow us to see masculinity and 
femininity as characteristics that can be attributed to both 
male and female biological categories. The Kikuyu women’s 
machete attack on the Luo boy can be seen as a gendered 
act, one that projects domination over the emasculated and 
subjugated other. Conflict scholars have written about the 
importance of separating sex from gendered notions of 
masculinity and femininity. Bohan makes the point that 
“the factors defining a particular transaction as feminine or 
masculine are not the sex of the actors but the situational 
parameters within which the performance occurs” (1997, 
39). In other words women can perform masculinity in the 
sense of power, domination, and violent subjugation. West 
and Zimmerman suggest that gender is an act, a social 
interaction that is separate from sex or sex category (1987).
Kibera’s post election conflict reveals the fluidity of gender 
roles and obligations. The conflict illustrates the fiction of 
ideal gender types, because it disrupts commonly held 
assumptions that men are inherently war-loving and 
women inherently peaceful. Gender roles and responsibil-
ities are socially constructed, localized, and subject to 
change depending on the context. The male/war female/
peace binaries are not fixed to a biological category. Paying 
attention to gender in times of conflict allows us to think of 
gender as actions – as enactments of masculine and femi-
nine traits that are independent from biological sex. As 
such, women can take on masculine aggressive and domi-
neering traits and men stereotypically feminine – caring 
and submissive – characteristics. Kibera’s example allows 
us to understand masculinity and femininity as linked 
more to power (or its absence) than to biological attributes.
To acknowledge men and women’s complicity in conflict, 
however, is not deny that they are victims. To be sure, both 
women and men can be victimized and empowered by war 
(Zarkov 2001). At a policy level, gendering conflict is 
important in devising appropriate responses that recognize 
both men and women’s agency and victimhood in times of 
war and peace.
4. “Go Back and Tell Them Who the Real Men Are” – the Battle for a 
Hegemonic Ethno-masculinity
The previous section unsettled the idea of fixed binaries 
between men and women. The scrambling of genders 
allows us to understand that characteristics ascribed to 
men and women are social constructions and not inherent 
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in their biology. Women can enact “masculine” traits just as 
men can perform “feminine” ones.
This section extends the analysis by arguing that notions of 
masculinity and femininity attach not only to individuals 
but to political, ethnic, or religious groups (Skjelsbaek 
2001). This proposition provides a compelling framework 
for explaining the nature of Kibera’s conflict and the rea-
sons it manifested in widespread incidents of gang rapes 
and forced circumcision. Although there is legal con-
testation as to whether acts like forced circumcision com-
prise sexual violence, I agree with Skjelsbaek that acts such 
as “rape, forced prostitution, forced marriage, forced cir-
cumcision and forced nakedness” are sexual violence 
(Skjelsbaek 2001, 212–13; also Carpenter 2006).
At a women’s hospital in Mashimoni, Kibera, a nurse 
recount ed how widespread forced circumcision was during 
the PEV.
We knew that women could be raped and many, many women I 
know were raped during that time. But in Laini Saba, men were 
being killed. They said they were circumcising them, but they 
would tell our men to put their penis’ on the railway line. Then 
they would cut them. They called it circumcision, but how do 
you cut a man’s penis in half and say that is circumcision?
Witnesses told the Waki Commission (established by the 
Kenya government to investigate the PEV) of similar inci-
dents of forced circumcision and mutilation. A doctor tes-
tifying to the commission said that what he witnessed was 
“pilary amputation” where his patient had his “whole penis 
actually cut” (Waki et al. 2008, 258). A Luo woman in 
Huruma estate, north-east of Nairobi city center, said:
I heard many people outside saying that “even here there are 
some ODM people we want to circumcise” They were many and 
were making a lot of noise. They pushed the door saying that 
“Kihii [Kikuyu for uncircumcised man] you are the ones troubl-
ing us”(Waki et al. 2008, 259)
Why were forced circumcisions part of the ethno-political 
battle in Kibera? What social relationships and processes 
made the performance of this act such a significant part of 
an ethnic and political conflict? Within the context of 
political and ethnic strife, gender allows us to see the forced 
circumcision of Luos by Kikuyu gangs as an act of domi-
nation.
To provide some context: Unlike the Kikuyu, Luo men do 
not traditionally get circumcised but have other coming-
of-age-rituals. Conversely, male circumcision is an import-
ant marker of adulthood in Kikuyu tradition, signifying the 
transition from boy to man. Within Kenya’s political con-
text, circumcision has been appropriated as a symbol of 
political power and wealth and an assertion of Kikuyu 
superiority over Luos (Ahlberg, Njoroge, and Olsson 2011). 
The political rivalry between the Luo and Kikuyu, and the 
accompanying ethnic chauvinism, has a long colonial and 
post-colonial history (Atieno-Odhiambo 2002). Kenya’s 
first president, Kenyatta, extolled the virtues of circum-
cision, and the Kikuyu elite frequently insist that they can-
not be ruled by “boys” (Ahlberg, Njoroge, and Olsson 2011; 
Kamau-Rutenberg 2009). This hegemonic masculinity is 
not simply an elitist attitude towards the other, but an 
endemic feature of Kikuyu discourse (Mucheru-Oyatta 
2007; Corey-Boulet 2011). Popular Kikuyu musician Kam-
ande wa Kioi’s song, Uhuru ni Witu (Uhuru is ours, refer-
ring to Kenya’s fourth president Uhuru Kenyatta) puts it 
this way:
Wegutha githuri na hiiki kai kiigi iri ya nyukwa?
You thump your chest about Hague,5 is Hague your mother’s?
Ni kuri kirumi kia Jehova, riria ombire thi na iguru
There is a curse from Jehova when he created heaven and earth
Abiristi mataruaga matigaathe Isiraeli
Philistines who do not circumcise cannot rule Israel
Iburahimu agia Jehova, erirwo athii akagirimwo
When Abraham gave Jehova trouble, he was told to get circum-
cised,
Nawe General wa Migingo ruhiu no ruraria thio
And you General of Migingo [referring to Raila Odinga] your knife 
is being sharpened.
5 Referring to the International Criminal Court in 
the Hague where Uhuru Kenyatta had been charged 
for crimes against humanity and his role in the PEV. 
The charges were dropped.
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Wa Kioi was charged for hate speech, but the idea that Luos 
cannot lead Kenya because they are uncircumcised remains 
a feature of Kenyan political discourse. Seen in this context, 
the penis mutilations asserted the dominance of Kikuyu 
masculinity – intricately intertwined with politics – over 
Luos as a group. The accompanying spectacle and perform-
ance – demanding that a man strip, jeering at his penis, 
pulling his foreskin, ordering him to place his penis on the 
railway line, and mutilating it with a panga (machete) – 
was a message, not just to the uncircumcised man, but to 
the ethnic and political group he represented. Forced cir-
cumcisions projected a hegemonic Kikuyu masculinity and 
this gendering act symbolized the Kikuyu’s assertion of 
power and domination over their Luo rivals.
If we treat ethnic and political groups as gendered, we can 
understand the character of this violence. Here, the perpe-
trator’s ethnic group is perceived as masculine, powerful, 
and composed of “real” men. The victim, the uncircum-
cised man and his group, are emasculated through the 
forced circumcision. The victim is not considered a real 
man because he is not circumcised, and his manhood is 
further devalued in the domineering and subjugating act of 
forcibly “circumcising” him. He and his ethnicity are femin-
ized in this gendered act. Hague (1997) examines gendered 
acts of feminizing and masculinizing group identities in 
the Bosnia-Herzegovina war. He shows how the masculine 
attributes of domination, violent subjugation, and power 
were attributed to the national identity of “Serb” and “Bos-
nian Serb” (Hague 1997). Similarly, Skjelsbaek points out 
that “the victim of sexual violence in the war-zone is vic-
timized by feminizing both the sex and the ethnic/
religious/political identity to which the victim belongs, 
likewise the perpetrator’s sex and ethnic/religious/political 
identity is empowered by becoming masculinized” (Skjels-
baek 2001, 225).
The nature of the beatings and circumcisions in Laini Saba 
prompted retaliation in Luo-dominated areas of Kibera. 
Luo members of the Taliban admitted that they used rape 
to send a message to their Mungiki rivals. Kikuyu factions 
were as guilty of rape as other factions in Kibera, but the 
following story, told by a woman of Kamba origin (seen as 
Kikuyu allies), illustrates particularly sharply how the strat-
egy of rape became a way of recovering Luo masculinity 
threatened or weakened by the conflict:
I was coming back from Ukambani where I had gone to vote. I 
didn’t know that there was any problem in Kibera so me I was 
just passing through to get home. I had not walked very far into 
Kibera when I met a group of youth. At first I did not even 
notice that they were all Luo. “Where are you going?” they asked 
me. They started to behave very aggressively towards me. I don’t 
remember what happened next, but I was raped by all of them. 
You think we are not men? You think we are not men? That is 
what they said to me. When they finished they said to me “go 
back and tell them who the real men are”.
Conflict authors write about the use of spectacle in violent 
acts in times of war as separating everyday sexual viol-
ations from wartime acts (Sharlach 2000; Carpenter 2006; 
Gerecke 2010). Although there is gender-based violence in 
Kibera during “normal times,” it is important to note that 
the incidences of gang rapes and forced circumcisions 
increased dramatically during the political crisis (Waki et 
al. 2008). These sexual acts of violence are deeply 
embedded in the ethnic and political conflict.
Gang rapes like the one described by the Kamba woman 
were not simply an act against the woman, but against the 
ethnic group she represents. In times of conflict rape has a 
significance that moves beyond the subjugation of women: 
it becomes a deliberate strategy to decimate the opposing 
side (Holmes 2013). “Rape is used to rip apart the fabric of 
society not only by undermining women but also their men” 
(Afshar 2004, 48). Indeed rape had multiple consequences 
on individuals, families, and communities in Kenya during 
the 2007/8 PEV. The Waki Commission found that rape had 
resulted in men leaving their wives. Women were traumat-
ized not only by the physical violation and their exposure to 
sexually transmitted diseases including HIV/AIDS, but also 
the disintegration of their families and the hostility they 
faced in some of their communities (Waki et al. 2008). And 
this is precisely why rape became such an important strat-
egy in the conflict: it became a means of breaking down, 
feminizing, the other side. The ringing words of the rapist 
gang “go back and tell them who the real men are” encapsu-
late this battle of masculinities. Through the spectacle of the 
rape, the Luo gang members were asserting their hegemonic 
masculinity over the Kikuyu and their Kamba allies.
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Conclusion
Gender and accompanying notions of masculinity and 
femininity help explain aspects of Kibera’s conflict that 
remain inexplicable in the dominant political, class, and 
ethnic frameworks. Using a gendered analysis reveals how 
gender intersects with political affiliation, class, and eth-
nicity to produce a violent exclusionary politics. Looking 
closely at what happened in Kibera disrupts fixed binary 
conceptions of gender roles and reveals how the hegem-
onic construction of masculinities and femininities fueled 
the conflict and shaped its outcome. As the violence 
unfolded it became clear that the battle for political 
power was also in fact a battle of masculinities between 
the Kikuyu and Luo groups and their allies. What was at 
stake was not only the loss of a national election, but the 
loss of an ethnic machismo, the loss of manhood. We see 
this in the acts of violence and the accompanying dis-
courses of “real men” versus “boys”. Indeed Kibera’s PEV 
shows us how gender was at the very heart of the violence 
– its inscription into Luo and Kikuyu political identities 
reveals a frightening yet illuminating aspect of the con-
flict.
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